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LOPEZ V. GONZALES: A WINDOW ON THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE PROCESS
Brent E. Newton*
I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, I discussed in this journal' the Fifth
Circuit's repeated error in dismissing as frivolous several strong
legal arguments, among them the contention that an alien's state
felony conviction for simple possession of illegal drugs was not
a "dru trafficking 2  crime that qualified as an "aggravated
felony" under the relevant provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.4 Several other circuits, while not classifying it
as outright frivolous, had by then also adamantly rejected this
argument.
5
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Southern District of Texas; Visiting Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author was co-counsel in
Toledo-Flores v. U.S., 547 U.S. 1054 (2006) (granting certiorari), and - U.S. __, 127 S.
Ct. 638 (2006) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted), which was the companion
case to Lopez v. Gonzales, _ U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006). The views expressed in
this article are solely the author's, and are not intended to express the views of the Federal
Public Defender's office.
1. Brent E. Newton, When Reasonable Jurists Could Disagree: The Fifth Circuit's
Misapplication of the Frivolousness Standard, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 157 (2001).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
4. See Newton, supra n. 1, at 163-64 (citing U.S. v. Morales-Ortiz, No. 98-50179 (5th
Cir. Oct. 21, 1998) (unpublished), and U.S. v. Arizmende-Matias, No. 98-50126 (5th Cir.
Aug. 18, 1998) (unpublished), as examples of the Fifth Circuit's treatment of that argument
as "frivolous"). A host of other Fifth Circuit cases took the same tack. See e.g. U.S. v.
Perez, No. 01-50622 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2002) (unpublished); U.S. v. Sanchez-Zuniga, 232
F.3d 209 (tbl.), 2000 WL 1273341, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000) (unpublished).
5. See e.g. US. v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271, 1272 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).
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Despite both the courts' treatment of the claim as entirely
lacking merit during the 1990s, and the Fifth Circuit's
mentioning the threat of sanctions to attorneys who continued to
press the argument,6 lawyers representing aliens continued to
litigate the issue in virtually every circuit and, when they were
unsuccessful, to seek review in the Supreme Court. Ultimately,
nearly fifteen years after the issue was first decided by a federal
appeals court, and only after a multi-dimensional split among
the circuits had developed, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue. In a 2006 opinion that resoundingly rejected the position
adopted by the majority of circuits, the Court held in Lopez that
a state felony conviction for simple possession of drugs is not a
drug trafficking crime constituting an aggravated felony under
the immigration laws.
8
The fifteen-year history of the litigation over this issue-a
history that ended only with the Supreme Court's decision in
Lopez-presents a compelling case study of significant
shortcomings in the federal appellate process. First, it
demonstrates that many federal appeals courts for well over a
decade gave short shrift to a compelling legal argument, which
resulted in the denial of relief to an extremely large class of
litigants. Second, it demonstrates that the Supreme Court failed
to intervene in a timely manner despite the importance of the
legal issue and the thousands of litigants affected nationwide.
Third, it demonstrates the Justice Department's failure to seek
Supreme Court review of an important issue even after it
became clear that review at the highest level was warranted.
Finally, and of particular interest to practitioners reading this
article, the history of the courts' treatment of the issue presented
in Lopez also demonstrates the need for counsel to preserve for
appeal a legal claim that, although foreclosed by adverse
precedent in a particular jurisdiction, eventually may be found
by the Supreme Court to be meritorious.
6. See Sanchez-Zuniga, 2000 WL 1273341 at *1 (citing US. v. Burleson, 22 F.3d 93,
95 (5th Cir. 1994)). In Burleson, the Fifth Circuit had stated that "[t]his appeal is frivolous.
We caution counsel. Federal Public Defenders are like all counsel subject to sanctions.
They have no duty to bring frivolous appeals; the opposite is true." Burleson, 22 F.3d at 95
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
7. Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1992).
8. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 627.
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II. "DRUG TRAFFICKING" AS AN "AGGRAVATED FELONY"
UNDER SECTION 101 (a)(43)(B) OF THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY ACT
Under federal immigration law, a non-citizen (including a
permanent resident alien) convicted of an aggravated felony
offense9 is virtually certain to be deported from the United
States l0 and, if he thereafter were to return illegally and be
discovered by immigration authorities, very likely would be
prosecuted in federal court under 8 U.S.C. 1326 and face
prison time followed by another deportation.' Moreover, such
an alien also would face dramatically more prison time than a
9. Aggravated felony offenses include the crimes traditionally deemed the most
serious, such as murder, rape, burglary, and drug trafficking. See 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(43)
(available at http://uscode.house.gov). The history of the aggravated felony provision of the
INA is discussed in Josh Adams, Student Author, The Conundrum of Classifying State
Drug Offenses Under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Guidelines Approach or
Hypothetical Federal Felony Test? 31 Vt. L. Rev. 185, 185-191 (2006), and in Nancy
Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope
of Proposed Reforms, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1936, 1936-62 (2000).
10. U.S. v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2002).
11. Section 1326 reads in pertinent part:
(a) In general
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who-
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States,
unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or
his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the
Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for
admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and
removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain
such advance consent under this chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined
under Title 18, or imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien described
in such subsection-
(1) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three
or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both,
or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined
under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both;
(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an
aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such Title, imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both....
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b) (available at http://www.uscode.house.gov).
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previously deported alien who illegally reentered without having
a prior conviction for an aggravated felony. 12 As the Supreme
Court explained in Lopez
An aggravated felony on [an alien's] criminal record has
worse collateral effects than a felony conviction simple.
Under the immigration statutes, for example, the Attorney
General's discretion to cancel the removal of a person
otherwise deportable does not reach a convict of an
aggravated felony. [8 U.S.C.] § 1229b(a)(3). Nor is an
aggravated felon eligible for asylum. [8 U.S.C.]
§§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). And under the
sentencing law, the Federal [Sentencing] Guidelines attach
special significance to the "aggravated felony" designation:
a conviction of unlawfully entering or remaining in the
United States receives an eight-level increase for a prior
aggravated felony conviction, but only four levels for "any
other felony." United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2 (Nov. 2005) (hereinafter
USSG); id., comment, n. 3 (adopting INA definition of
aggravated felony). 13
Although there are many types of aggravated felonies, one
of the most common types arising in immigration cases during
the past two decades has been a drug trafficking crime. 14 Since
12. See Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 627-28 (discussing the civil and criminal implications of an
alien's conviction of an aggravated felony offense); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1), (2)
(providing for 10-year maximum prison sentence for defendants with simple felony record;
20-year maximum prison sentence for defendants with aggravated felony record).
13. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 628.
14. The federal government has not published data on aliens deported as aggravated
felons. According to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, however, a recent
request under the Freedom of Information Act by Syracuse University yielded some data
concerning aliens' aggravated felony status in deportation proceedings. These data show
that in the fifteen years before Lopez was decided, an estimated 300,000 aliens were
deported as aggravated felons. A significant portion of those aliens (approximately one-
third) had drug-related prior convictions, which could have been either for simple
possession or for actual drug trafficking (as that term is commonly understood).
Presumably, then, of those aggravated felony deportations, many thousands involved aliens
whose most serious prior conviction was a state felony conviction for simple possession of
illegal drugs. See How Often is the Aggravated Felony Statute Used? http://www.trac.syr
.edu/immigration/reports/158 (accessed May 16, 2007; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process); New Data on the Processing of Aggravated Felons,
http://www.trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/175 (accessed May 16, 2007; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
Although a large percentage of these aliens would not have been deported based
solely on prior state felony convictions for possession if the Board of Immigration Appeals
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1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) has provided that an alien's
conviction for "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as
defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking
crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)," qualifies as an
aggravated felony.' 5  While framing the issue to be decided in
Lopez, the Supreme Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is the
federal penal statute criminalizing the possession or use of a
firearm in furtherance of a "drug-trafficking crime," and
observed that
The general phrase "illicit trafficking" is left undefined, but
§ 924(c)(2) of Title 18 identifies the subcategory by
defining "drug trafficking crime" as "any felony punishable
under the Controlled Substances Act" or under either of
two other federal statutes having no bearing on this case.
Following the listing, [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)] ... provides
in its penultimate sentence that "[t]he term [aggravated
felony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph
whether in violation of Federal or State law" or, in certain
circumstances, "the law of a foreign country."'
16
As explained below, these statutory cross-references,
implicating three different titles of the United States Code,
spawned a tremendous amount of litigation that took a decade
has followed its own favorable decisions in In Re L-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 89 (BIA 1995)
(en banc), and In Re K-V-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1163 (BIA 1999) (en banc), both of
which are discussed later in this article, the BIA overruled these precedents in In Re Yanez-
Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390 (2002) (en banc). Moreover, even before Yanez-Garcia, L-
G- and K-V-D-- were not followed in federal circuits that had issued decisions
disagreeing with them. See e.g. Amaral, 977 F.2d 33. In addition, the BIA's favorable
decisions did not apply in the criminal immigration context, where circuit precedent was
almost uniformly against aliens charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The latter point is further
discussed later in this article.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(B) (emphasis added). Section 924(c) provides in pertinent
part that
(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who,
during and in relation to any... drug trafficking crime.., for which the person
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or
who, in furtherance of any such crime possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such ... drug trafficking crime be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.
(c)(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term "drug trafficking crime" means
any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et
seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. §951 et seq.),
or chapter 705 of title 46.
16. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 628.
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and a half to resolve. During that time, many thousands of aliens
were treated as aggravated felons in civil and criminal
immigration proceedings only because of their prior state felony
convictions for simple possession of illegal drugs.
III. THE UNNECESSARILY CONVOLUTED HISTORY OF LITIGATION
OVER THE MEANING OF "DRUG TRAFFICKING"
A. The Justice Department's Position
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Justice Department 17 took
the position in deportation proceedings that an alien's state
conviction for simple possession of illegal drugs classified as a
felony under the relevant state's penal laws' 8  was drug
trafficking under 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(B), notwithstanding
that simple possession generally is a misdemeanor under federal
law and ordinarily is not considered "drug trafficking."' 9 The
Justice Department's argument was as follows:
The statutory phrase "any felony punishable under
the [federal] Controlled Substances Act" should be
disassembled into its separate components of (1)
"any felony" and (2) "punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act;" and
17. In the earliest litigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a branch of
the Justice Department, announced the position of the Department, but it was later joined
(in section 1326 criminal prosecutions) by the criminal section of the Justice Department.
When the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security in 2003, see generally 6 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (codifying
Homeland Security Act of 2002), DHS maintained the position of the former INS.
18. Unlike the federal government, the majority of states treat simple possession of any
amount of any illegal drug (save marijuana) as a felony. See Brent E. Newton, Compilation
of Fifty States' Drug Laws (unpublished working paper, Aug. 1, 2006) (on file with
author).
19. "Simple possession" refers to the act of possessing illegal drugs (presumably for
personal use) rather than possession with the intent to sell or otherwise illegally distribute
the drugs. See Salinas v. U.S., 547 U.S. 188 (2006) (per curiam). A first offense involving
simple possession of illegal drugs (save certain quantities of crack cocaine and any amount
of flunitrazepam, commonly known as the date-rape drug) is punished as a misdemeanor; a
subsequent conviction is punishable as a felony offense. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
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" so long as a state conviction satisfied both prongs
independently, the underlying offense qualified as a
drug trafficking crime, even if it involved simple
possession instead of actual trafficking in illegal
drugs; and thus
" because many states punished simple possession of
illegal drugs as a felony (even though possession
was, if a first offense, "punishable under the
Controlled Substance Act" only in the sense that it
was treated as a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. §
844(a)), a state felony conviction for simple
possession should be treated as a drug trafficking
crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
The Justice Department's position received mixed reviews
in early litigation. Three-judge panels of the First and Second
Circuits agreed with the Department, while the en banc Board of
Immigration Appeals (the highest administrative tribunal within
the INS) unanimously rejected it.21 Because those initial
decisions set the stage for subsequent litigation over the issue,
they warrant close analysis.
B. The Early Decisions
1. The First Circuit's Initial Decision: Amaral
In Amaral v. INS,22 the first court to address the issue
provided alternative rationales for its decision that an alien's
Rhode Island felony convictions for simple possession qualified
as drug trafficking. After observing that the issue on appeal
concerned the operative term "trafficking" in
20. In Re L-G-, 211. & N. Dec. 89, 92-93 (BA 1995) (en banc) (discussing the legal
position of the INS).
21. Compare Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1994) (agreeing with Justice
Department's position) and Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1992) (same), with In re
L-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 97-102 & n. 5 (disagreeing with Jenkins and Amaral).
22. 977 F.2d 33 (lst Cir. 1992).
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8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(B), the court described the case as
follows:
Petitioner [an alien ordered deported] contends that the
plain meaning of "trafficking" requires something more
than simple possession. He contends that the harsh
consequences accompanying aggravated felon status were
intended only for serious drug traffickers and not simple
users or possessors.
Both the 1988 and 1990 definitions refer to 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(2). The term "drug trafficking crime" is defined in
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) to include "any felony punishable
under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et
seq.), the Controlled Substance Import and Export Act (21
U.S.C. § 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)." Thus, for a
drug offense to come within 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and
hence, in turn, to fit within the definition of aggravated
felony, two criteri[a] must be met: 1) the offense must be
punishable under one of the three enumerated statutes, and
2) the offense must be a felony.
Petitioner does not dispute that the first criterion-an
offense punishable under one of the three enumerated
statutes-is met. Possession of drugs is punishable under
21 U.S.C. § 844(a), a part of the Controlled Substances
Act.... Petitioner contends that the second criterion
necessary for an offense to be considered a drug trafficking
crime is not satisfied because his 1989 simple possession
conviction should not qualify as a felony under § 844(a). A
felony, however, is defined under the Controlled
Substances Act as "any Federal or State offense classified
by applicable Federal or State Law as a felony." 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(13).... The maximum penalty under 21 U.S.C.
§ 844(a) for simple possession without prior convictions is
one year. Hence, absent prior convictions, simple
possession is not a felony. However, one prior conviction
turns possession into a felony since the maximum penalty
increases to over a year. Here, Petitioner had two prior drug
convictions which, under the literal application of §§ 844(a)
and 3559(a), render the 1989 possession conviction a
felony.23
23. Amaral, 977 F.2d at 35-36.
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Thus the First Circuit's initial rationale was specific to the
facts of the case before it: Amaral had three sequential prior
state felony convictions for simple possession of drugs, which
meant that he could have been prosecuted (in the second and
third cases) as a felony drug offender under federal law.24 His
criminal record arguably fit within the statutory definition of
drug trafficking because his two subsequent state convictions for
simple possession were concurrently "punishable" as felonies
under the federal Controlled Substances Act,25 and the First
Circuit relied on this fact in reaching its primary holding.
However, in a footnote, the First Circuit continued by
articulating an alternative reason for its decision:
Moreover, possession is a felony under the applicable state
law. In Rhode Island, the maximum imprisonment for
possession is three years, R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28-
4.01(C)(1)(a), and any criminal offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year is a felony, R.I. Gen.
Laws § 11-1-2. Thus, under the definition of a felony in 21
U.S.C. § 802(13), Petitioner's possession convictions,
which are felonies under Rhode Island law, are also
considered felonies under the Controlled Substances Act. 26
This second rationale-that any of Amaral's three state felony
convictions qualified as drug trafficking-was dicta27 entirely
unnecessary to the court's holding that Amaral was an
24. 18 U.S.C. § 844(a) (providing that a second or subsequent conviction for simple
possession of drugs is a felony offense under federal law if the illegal act of possession
occurred after the first conviction was final).
25. See Amaral, 977 F.2d at 35-36 (setting out the analysis quoted earlier in this
section). The Supreme Court's decision in Lopez implicitly recognized but did not address
the issue of whether an alien's second or subsequent state felony conviction for simple
possession qualifies as drug trafficking insofar as it is "punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act" as a federal felony (assuming the case had been prosecuted in federal
court and the defendant had been subject to the recidivist enhancement provision in 21
U.S.C. § 851). See Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 630 n. 6.
26. Amaral, 977 F.2d at 36 n. 3; accord U.S. v. Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294, 1301 (lst Cir.
1994) (citing Amaral).
27. See U.S. v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (describing
dictum as "a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding-that, being peripheral, may not have
received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered it. . . . Dictum is a
general argument or observation unnecessary to the decision.... The basic formula [for
distinguishing holding from dictum] is to take account of facts treated by the judge as
material and determine whether the contested opinion is based upon them.") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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aggravated felon. Despite its tenuous legal footing, however, the
alternative rationale soon took on a life of its own.
2. The Second Circuit's Initial Decision. Jenkins
Soon after Amaral was decided, the Second Circuit
uncritically adopted its dicta as the controlling rule in Jenkins v.
INS,28 which squarely raised the issue-whether a prior state
felony conviction for simple possession should be treated as a
drug trafficking crime under federal law-that had been
peripheral in Amaral. The Second Circuit decided in Jenkins that
a prior state conviction for mere possession should be so
classified, and adopted the second of the First Circuit's Amaral
rationales without significant analysis of its own.
29
3. The BIA's Initial Decision. L-G-
A few months after the Second Circuit's decision in
Jenkins, the BIA first addressed the issue. In In Re L-G-, 30 a
panel of BIA judges, and eventually the en banc BIA,31
unanimously concluded that an alien's state conviction for
simple possession of powder cocaine, although classified as a
felony under applicable state law, was not a drug trafficking
offense under 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(B) because it was
punishable only as a misdemeanor under federal law. In
reaching this decision, the BIA found fault with the logic
applied by the First and Second Circuits in Amaral and
Jenkins.
32
Initially, the BIA stated that it was improper to rely on the
definition of "felony" in 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) 33 because that
definition was intended solely for use in determining whether a
federal defendant's prior state drug conviction could serve as a
predicate for a sentencing enhancement under the federal drug
28. 32 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 1994).
29. Jenkins, 32 F.3d at 14 (citing footnote 3 of Amaral).
30. 20 I. & N. Dec. 905 (BIA 1994).
31. In re L-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 89 (BIA 1995) (en banc) (affirming BIA panel
decision).
32. Id. at 93-102 (analyzing Jenkins); see also id. at 97 n. 5 (discussing Amaral).
33. Id. at 93-94.
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laws.34 The BIA concluded that, rather than look to Title 21's
definition of "felony," it should use the more appropriate
definition was found in Title 18. After all, the BIA reasoned,
8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(B)'s definition of drug trafficking was
taken from 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).35 The definition of felony in
Title 18 appears in 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), which treats a felony (in
different grades) as a federal offense punishable by more than
one year in prison,36 and does not broadly define felony as
including crimes classified by a state as felonies if they are
punishable by no more than one year in prison when prosecuted
in federal court.37 Relying on this narrower meaning of felony,
the BIA concluded that "any felony," as used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(2),
refers to any class of [federal] felony found under 18
U.S.C. § 3559(a). A "drug trafficking crime" under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) is therefore any felony violation of the
federal drug laws, i.e., any offense under those laws where
the maximum term of imprisonment exceeds 1 year.38
And a first offense for simple possession would not so qualify
under 21 U.S.C.§ 844(a).
Next turning to the legislative history of § 924(c)(2), the
BIA observed that, prior to its 1988 amendment, "drug
trafficking crime" was expressly defined in the statute as "any
felony violation of Federal law involving the distribution,
manufacture, or importation of any controlled substance." 39 The
BIA then noted that the 1988 amendment to section 924(c)(2)-
which deleted this definition-was labeled a "clarification" by
Congress, and was "not intended to effect a major departure
from prior law.",
40
34. Id. at 93, 98-99 (discussing 21 U.S.C. § 801(13), and noting that it defines "felony"
to include "any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a
felony").
35. Id. at 93-94.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(l)-(9) (listing five grades of felonies and four grades of
misdemeanors).
37. L-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 94 ("We find this comprehensive list of felony classes
provides a more reasonable explanation for the term 'any felony' as used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(2) than that [in 21 U.S.C. § 802(13)].").
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. Id. (quoting the former statutory definition).
40. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4181, 4360).
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The BIA found the statute's former express definition
relevant to the legal analysis in two ways: First, it explicitly
referred to a "felony violation of Federal law," and second, "the
[drug] offenses it described are those that.., would [be]
consider[ed] to be 'trafficking' as that term is commonly
defined.",41 Therefore, the BIA concluded, the alien's prior
Louisiana conviction for simple possession of powder cocaine
was not a "drug trafficking crime"-and, thus, not an aggravated
felony-under 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(B) because it was
punishable only as a misdemeanor under the Controlled
Substances Act and did not involve any "distribution" element.42
Finally, after engaging in a thorough interpretation of the
statute and a thorough analysis of the legislative history-
something that the First and Second Circuits had not done in
Amaral and Jenkins-the BIA also concluded that sound "policy
reasons" also supported its interpretation. The BIA stressed that,
absent a clear statement from Congress in enacting immigration
legislation, "the Immigration and Nationality Act generally does
not attach different treatment to [identical] state and federal...
offenses. 43 Following the position articulated by the Justice
Department and adopted by the First and Second Circuits would,
then, "result in widely disparate consequences for similarly
situated aliens based solely on differing state classifications of
identical drug offenses" (such as where State A classifies simple
possession of drugs as a "misdemeanor" but State B classifies
the identical crime as a "felony" under its state law).44
Notably, despite the far-reaching effect of the BIA's
administrative ruling, the Justice Department did not seek
federal judicial review of In Re L-G-. 5 This meant that, as of
1995, immigration judges around the country were bound by the
BIA's decision, while immigration judges in the First and
Second Circuits (which include two major cities, Boston and
New York, with large immigrant populations) were not. The
resulting disparity in treatment of identically situated aliens in
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 96.
43. Id. at 100 (citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting "the Government's
decision not to seek review of In re L-G-").
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different federal circuits was a consequence of the fact that a
decision of the BIA is binding on all immigration judges unless
a federal appeals court issues a contrary decision. If that
happens, and only if it happens, the BIA's decision does not
control immigration judges within that circuit, for they must
follow the contrary decision of the relevant court of appeals.
46
4. The Second Circuit's Second Decision: Aguirre
Less than a year after the BIA decided In re L-G-, the
Second Circuit reconsidered Jenkins in Aguirre v. INS.47 The
Second Circuit held there that the legal issue was "fairly
debatable" in view of L-G-.4 8 In addition, the court held that
because it then appeared that the BIA's decision would be
followed by immigration judges outside of the Second Circuit if
Jenkins were not overruled, it should abandon the position that it
had taken only two years earlier in the interest of national
uniformity. 49 For the moment, this left the First Circuit standing
alone.
5. The First Circuit's Second Decision: Restrepo-Aguilar
Unlike the Second Circuit, the First Circuit refused in the
wake of In Re L-G- to reconsider the position it had first
articulated in Amaral. The issue was presented-albeit in the
criminal context instead of in the civil-deportation context-in
United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar,50 but the First Circuit
explicitly adhered there to its prior dicta in Amaral. In rejecting
the BIA's position in favor of its own, the First Circuit arguably
mischaracterized the holding in In Re L-G- as "rest[ing] to a
significant degree on policy concerns" (i.e., national uniformity
in the application of the immigration laws), and ignored the
BIA's extensive statutory interpretation and its analysis of the
legislative history.51 Thus, even after the Second Circuit's
decision in Aguirre, identically situated aliens facing deportation
46. See e.g. Singh v. lichert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
47. 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996).
48. Id. at 317.
49. Id.
50. 74 F.3d 361, 366-67 (1st Cir. 1996).
51. Id. at 366.
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(i.e., those with single prior state felony convictions for simple
possession) received disparate treatment depending on the
circuits in which their proceedings were conducted. And the
situation only got worse as time went on.
C. The State of the Law after Restrepo-Aguilar
1. Decisions in Other Circuits
The state of non-uniformity that emerged after the First
Circuit's reaffirmation of Amaral in 1996 was exacerbated in the
ensuing decade-both in the civil (deportation) context and the
criminal (sentencing) context. In 1996, the Tenth Circuit,
without mentioning the unanimous en banc decision in In Re L-
G- that had been issued only the year before, agreed with the
First Circuit; in 1997, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits followed
suit. 52 In the following three years, two more circuits-the Ninth
and Eleventh-followed the trail blazed by the First Circuit in
the early 1990s.5 3 Remarkably, such a growing consensus
among federal circuit judges did not deter the en banc BIA in
late 1999 from reaffirming In Re L-G- as correct when
52. U.S. v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130
F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997); US. v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997). These
decisions were rendered in criminal appeals of sentences imposed under both 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2), which provides for an enhanced sentence of up to twenty years in a criminal
prosecution in which the alien was convicted of an aggravated felony before being
deported and thereafter illegally reentering the United States, and a corresponding
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. But the reasoning in each case turned on the
language of 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(B), which applied equally to civil immigration cases.
See e.g. Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying
Cabrera-Sosa in civil immigration appeal); Garcia v. Pasquarell, 117 Fed. Appx. 337, 339
(5th Cir. 2004) (applying Hinojosa-Lopez in civil immigration appeal); Herrera-Soto v.
INS, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8499 at *3 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying Briones-Mata in civil
immigration appeal); see also U.S. v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 507-10 (5th Cir.
2001) (following Hinojosa-Lopez in a criminal prosecution in which the alien-defendant
collaterally attacked his prior deportation under U.S. v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828
(1987)). Such a collateral attack in a federal criminal prosecution requires a court to
interpret immigration statutes in the civil context. See Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d at 509-
10.
53. U.S. v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2000); US. v. Simon, 168 F.3d
1271(1 1th Cir. 1999). The Fourth Circuit joined this group of circuits in 2003. See U.S. v.
Wilson, 316 F.3d 506, 512-14 (4th Cir. 2003).
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deciding In Re K-V-D-. 5 4 The BIA's continued adherence to
In Re L-G-- meant that by 1999, in deportation proceedings
outside of the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, an alien with a single prior state felony conviction for
simple possession was not treated as an aggravated felon.
2. The Second Circuit's Return to the Jenkins Standard in
Criminal Appeals: Pornes-Garcia
At the same time that the BIA refused to adopt the contrary
position of six circuits in the civil immigration context, another
schism was developing among the federal courts of appeals
themselves. After deciding in 1996 to follow In Re L-G- in
civil immigration cases, the Second Circuit reverted in United
States v. Pornes-Garcia55 to its original position in criminal
immigration cases, thus creating a double standard for aliens in
civil and criminal immigration cases.
In Pornes-Garcia, the Second Circuit held that the meaning
of "aggravated felony" in the criminal-sentencing context
included state felony convictions for simple possession of drugs,
while in civil immigration cases it did not.56 Despite the fact that
the term in the criminal context expressly drew its meaning from
the definition used in the civil context, 57 the Second Circuit
stated that "[t]his case presents one of those instances where
different interpretations of the same term are warranted by the
differing purposes of the provisions incorporating that term."58
The court explained that its deference to the BIA in Aguirre had
been primarily for purposes of "uniform application of
immigration laws" rather than a matter of principle, and
concluded that "[i]n the very different context of criminal
sentencing, those concerns are not present."
59
54. 22 1. & N. Dec. 1163 (BIA 1999) (en banc).
55. 171 F.3d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880 (1999).
56. 1d. at 146-47.
57. Id. at 145 (noting that USSG § 2L1.2 expressly incorporates the definition of
aggravated felony from 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (the
criminal illegal reentry statute, which provides for increased maximum punishment for
aliens who illegally reenter after a deportation that follows a conviction for an aggravated
felony).
58. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d at 147.
59. Id.
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And as if the Second Circuit's approach in Pornes-Garcia
were not itself a sufficient addition to the burgeoning confusion
and inconsistency in the law, the Fifth Circuit eventually refused
to follow the bifurcated approach for civil and criminal cases
espoused in Pornes-Garcia. It held instead that a state felony
conviction for simple possession was drug trafficking in both
contexts,60  while the Ninth Circuit eventually adopted in
Cazarez-Guiterrez v. Ashcroft6' the double standard that the
Second Circuit had embraced in Pornes-Garca.6 2
D. The Tide Begins to Turn. Judge Canby's Dissent in
Ibarra-Galindo and the Third Circuit's Decision in Gerbier
By 2000, when the Ninth Circuit decided to follow the First
Circuit's decision in Amaral, it appeared that there was an
insurmountable wall of circuit precedent against the position
taken five years earlier by the unanimous en banc BIA, so much
so that the decisions of the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits failed even to cite the BIA's decision in In Re L-G-.
63
In addition, some circuits claimed that the "plain language" of
the relevant statutory' provisions supported the Justice
Department's position. And, as noted at the outset of this
article, the Fifth Circuit was by 2000 so entrenched in its
position that it actually threatened to impose sanctions on
appellate counsel who continued to contend that an alien's
60. U.S. v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he statutory language
is clear-and is the same-whether applied in sentencing or [civil] immigration cases."),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 935 (2001).
61. 382 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2004). This case is discussed more fully in section (I1)(F)
below.
62. Id. at 911-12.
63. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271; Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691; Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d
308; Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998.
64. See Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d at 1340; Simon, 168 F.3d at 1272 (same); see also
Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d at 310 (asserting that "Congress made a deliberate policy decision
to include as an 'aggravated felony' a drug crime that is a felony under state law but only a
misdemeanor" under federal law); Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d at 694 (same); Hernandez-
Avalos, 251 F.3d at 510 (5th Cir. 2001) (same). The Fourth Circuit concluded that "any
ambiguity in the statute is minimal at best." Wilson, 316 F.3d at 514 n. 5.
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single state felony conviction for simple possession was not a
drug trafficking offense and thus not an aggravated felony.
65
Yet despite this seemingly solid wall of circuit authorit e a
small crack appeared. In United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, a
criminal immigration case in which the Ninth Circuit majority
claimed that "the plain meaning" of the "unambiguous"
statutory provisions at issue supported its position, 67 Judge
Canby dissented.68
The majority in Ibarra-Galindo "decline[d] to heed the
discordant pronouncement of the BIA, but rather [followed] the
unanimous chorus of six circuits," 69 so Judge Canby began his
dissent by acknowledging that "[i]t is a somewhat daunting
exercise to conclude that the majority has reached an incorrect
result when six other circuits agree with it."70 He proceeded,
however, to offer several reasons supporting his decision to
dissent:
1) the language in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) and 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) was not plain and, indeed,
could just as easily be read to mean that a state
felony conviction for simple possession had to be
punishable as a felony under the federal
Controlled Substances Act to qualify as drug
trafficking;
65. For additional discussion of the Fifth Circuit's position, see note 6, supra,
addressing Sanchez-Zuniga, 2000 WL 1273341. Sanchez-Zuniga's appellate brief
acknowledged the Fifth Circuit's prior decision in Hinojosa-Lopez, but contended that it
was wrongly decided (and in support of that position cited the BIA's decisions in In Re L-
G- and In Re K-V-D-). The brief specifically stated that
Mr. Sanchez-Zuniga must raise this issue here if he wishes to seek review in the
United States Supreme Court. See McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 511 U.S.
659, 659-60 (1994) (per curiam) (holding that raising an issue on appeal that is
foreclosed by circuit precedent is the only way to preserve it for possible
Supreme Court review).
Br. of Appellant, U.S. v. Sanchez-Zuniga, 2000 WL 34214474 (5th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000), at
*10-*11 n. 3. It appears that the Fifth Circuit continued to deem this legal argument
"frivolous" for at least another year and a half. See U.S. v. Perez, No. 01-50622 (5th Cir.
Feb. 20, 2002) (unpublished).
66. 206 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 1340 & n. 2.
68. Id. at 1341-45 (Canby, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1340-41 (same).
70. Id. at 1341 (same).
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2) "common sense rebels at the thought of
classifying" simple possession "as a drug
trafficking crime";
3) the legislative history of section 924(c)(2) showed
that Congress did not intend to abolish its former
express definition of "drug trafficking," which
described trafficking as conduct that would
qualify as a federal felony offense;
4) the definition of felony in 21 U.S.C. § 802(13)
was "utterly irrelevant" to the meaning of felony
when used in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and
5) the penultimate sentence of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(43)-which states that any aggravated felony
listed in that statute includes violations of state or
federal law--did not mean that a state felony drug
offense concurrently "punishable" under federal
law as a misdemeanor was a drug trafficking
offense.7'
Judge Canby's legal analysis, of course, was very similar to that
of the en banc BIA's decision in In Re L-G-, which he cited in
support of his dissent.72 And he concluded by stating that if
substantial doubt remained about the meaning of "drug
trafficking" after analyzing the language of the statute and its
legislative history, then the rule of lenity required an
interpretation that favored the defendant in a criminal case.
73
71. Id. at 1341-44 (same).
72. Id. at 1344 (same).
73. The rule of lenity is a hoary maxim of statutory construction providing that, if a
court still has doubts about a criminal statute's meaning after analyzing its language and its
legislative history, the statute is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of a criminal
defendant. See e.g. U.S. v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1994) (applying the rule). A
similar doctrine of statutory construction applies to ambiguous immigration statutes. See
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (requiring courts to "constru[e] any
lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien"); cf Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1, 11 n. 8 (2004) (holding that immigration statutes that apply in both civil and
criminal cases are subject to the rule of lenity and must be interpreted the same way in both
contexts).
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The intellectual force of Judge Canby's dissent caused the
small crack in the wall of adverse circuit precedent to grow. The
following year, the majority of a Third Circuit panel broke ranks
with the circuits still following Amaral and concluded in
Gerbier v. Holmes74 that-at least in the civil immigration
context-a state felony conviction for simple possession was not
drug trafficking and, thus, was not an aggravated felony. Unlike
the Second Circuit in Aguirre, the Third Circuit did not simply
defer to the position of the BIA in civil immigration cases solely
to promote uniform application of the immigration laws. Instead,
like Judge Canby's dissenting opinion in Ibarra-Galindo, the
Third Circuit's opinion in Gerbier followed the legal analysis of
In Re L-G- and explored alternative interpretations of the
operative statutory language: "any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act."75
In concluding that a state felony conviction for simple
possession was not drug trafficking, the Third Circuit looked not
only to the relevant statutory language-in particular, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c 6)(2)-but also to the legislative history behind the
statute. In addition, the Third Circuit, like the BIA and Judge
Canby, rejected the other circuits' reliance on the definition of
felony in Title 21 (in which the Controlled Substances Act
appears) in favor of the definition in Title 18.77 Finally, the
Third Circuit stated that its interpretation promoted the uniform
application of the immigration laws by treating all aliens in
accordance with a definition of drug trafficking that did not
depend on the vagaries of state law.
78
74. 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002). Fifth Circuit Judge Thomas M. Reavley, sitting by
designation on the Third Circuit, dissented in a one-paragraph opinion; he contended that
"too many circuit courts have chosen the other way and I would follow them in the interest
of consistency and uniformity of federal law." Id. at 318 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
Because Gerbier did not implicate any criminal immigration statutes or the
Sentencing Guidelines, the Third Circuit addressed only the civil immigration context. See
id. at 307 ("Whatever may be the proper construction in a Sentencing Guidelines case, we
do not agree that the plain meaning of 'drug trafficking crime' under § 924(c) in the
deportation context encompasses state felony convictions that would merely be
misdemeanors under federal law when there is otherwise no trafficking component to the
state law conviction.").
75. Id. at 302-18.
76. Id. at 308-09.
77. Id. at 309-11,315-16.
78. Id. at 311-13.
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The developing split among the circuits laid bare by
Gerbier provided a sound basis for the Justice Department to
seek either en banc review by the full Third Circuit or Supreme
Court review of the Third Circuit's decision. Inexplicably,
however, the Justice Department sought neither, 79 and so
litigation over this issue continued in the lower courts.
E. A Retreat by the BIA: Yanez-Garcia
Shortly after the Third Circuit decided Gerbier, the en banc
BIA decided In Re Yanez-Garcia,80 a deportation case arising in
the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction. In that case, the BIA abandoned
the position it first articulated in In Re L-G- and affirmed in
In Re K-V-D-, and observed that
[t]he clear trend among the [federal] circuit courts has been
toward interpreting the term "felony," as used in§ 924(c)(2), by reference to the definition set forth in 21
U.S.C. § 802(13), which permits a state drug offense to
qualify as a felony under the CSA even if it could only be
punished as a misdemeanor under federal law.
8 1
Although recognizing that the Third Circuit's two-to-one
decision in Gerbier had adopted its reasoning in In Re L-G-,
the BIA ultimately concluded that "the best approach" was "one
82of deference" to the majority of federal circuits. In a lengthy
and cogent dissenting opinion, however, Board Member Lory
Diana Rosenberg (who had joined the unanimous decision in In
Re L-G-, and who wrote the majority opinion in In Re K-V-
D), chastised the majority for abandoning its earlier position in
favor of "expediency and acquiescence." 3 "If we are going to
opt for a changed interpretation," she contended, "we need
better reasons," especially considering the fact that the BIA's
new position would have draconian consequences for
79. See 3d Cir. Elec. Docket, Appeal No. 00-2335 (available on PACER).
80. 23 1. & N. Dec. 390 (BIA 2002) (en banc), on petition for review, Yanez-Garcia v.
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 2004).
81. Id. at 394-95.
82. Id. at 396.
83. Id. at 402 (Rosenberg & Espenoza, JJ., dissenting).
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"thousands of [aliens] who have been convicted of simple
possession of controlled substances."
84
F. The Shift in Jurisprudence Immediately Preceding Lopez
Within two years of the BIA's switch in position based on
what it perceived as near consensus among the circuits,
however, change came rapidly in the courts. In Cazarez-
Gutierrez the Ninth Circuit, recognizing that it had in Ibarra-
Galindo taken an inconsistent approach in the criminal
immigration context, concluded that the Third Circuit's decision
in Gerbier was the better approach.8 6 The Ninth Circuit also
delved into the legislative history-something it had not done
earlier in Jbarra-Galindo--which indicated that Congress never
intended "drug trafficking" to include a state felony conviction
for simple possession that would be punished only as a
misdemeanor under federal law. 87 This change at the Ninth
Circuit was soon followed by the Sixth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Palacios-Suarez88 and the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim. 89 In Palacios-Suarez, the
Sixth Circuit held that a state felony conviction for simple
possession was not a drug trafficking offense and, thus not an
aggravated felony in the criminal immigration context, ° while
the Seventh Circuit held in Achim that it was not an aggravated
felony in the civil immigration context.
9 1
After engaging in legal analysis similar to that undertaken
by the BIA back in 1995-refusing to incorporate the definition
of "felony" from Title 21; refusing to follow other circuits'
84. Id. at 409, 418.
85. 382 F.3d 905.
86. Id. at 910-18. In addition to citing Gerbier with approval, the Ninth Circuit relied
on the reasoning of BIA Board Member Rosenberg's dissenting opinion in Yanez-Garcia.
See id. at 917.
87. Compare Cazarez-Gutierrez, 382 F.3d at 914-17 (examining the legislative history
of the statute), with lbarro-Galindo, 206 F.3d at 1340 n. 2 ("Because the statutory text is
unambiguous, we must decline.., the dissent's invitation to reach a contrary result by
resorting to the text of the congressional committee reports.").
88. 418 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005).
89. 441 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2006).
90. 418 F.3d at 696-97.
91. 441 F.3d at 533-34.
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facile interpretation of "any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act"; looking to the legislative history;
and seeking to promote national uniformity in the application of
the immigration laws-both the Sixth Circuit in Palacios-Suarez
and the Seventh Circuit in Gonzales-Gomez disagreed with the
position then embraced by a majority of other circuits. 92 Judge
Posner, who wrote for the Seventh Circuit, described the Justice
Department's interpretation of the relevant statutes as a "strained
reading of the statutory language" and, in a more general
manner, stated that "[tihe only consistency that we can see in the
government's treatment of the meaning of 'aggravated felony' is
that the alien always loses."
93
By early 2006, even the Justice Department acknowledged
that it was necessary for the Supreme Court to address the issue
of whether a state felony conviction for simple possession was
an aggravated felony. In Lopez v. Gonzales,94  a civil
immigration appeal, the Solicitor General, although contending
that the petitioner was not entitled to relief, nonetheless agreed
that his petition for writ of certiorari should be granted because
of an "entrenched and multi-dimensional" circuit split. 95 The
Court then granted certiorari in both Lopez and Toledo-Flores v.
United States,96 a companion criminal-immigration appeal
raising the same issue. The two cases were consolidated for oral
argument.
97
IV. LOPEZ AND TOLEDO-FLORES
A. The Government's Position
Before the Supreme Court, the Justice Department
essentially echoed the arguments it had made in the courts of
92. Gonzalez-Gomez, 441 F.3d at 533-36; Palacios-Suarez, 418 F.3d at 695-701.
93. Gonzalez-Gomez, 441 F.3d at 533, 535.
94. 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1651 (2006).
95. Br. of Respt. in Response to Pet. for Writ of Cert., Lopez v. Gonzales, No. 05-547,
2006 WL 173274, at *9-*10 (Jan. 24, 2006).
96. 126 S. Ct. 1652 (2006) (granting certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's decision in
U.S. v. Toledo-Flores, 149 Fed. Appx. 241 (5th Cir. 2005)).
97. See id.
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appeals since the early 1990s with one exception: The
government conceded at last that the definition of felony in Title
21 was irrelevant. 98 The government persisted, however, in
contending that the meaning of the pertinent statutory
language-"any felony punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act"-was "plain," and that it clearly included an
alien's state-law felony conviction for simple possession that
was concurrently punishable (even as a misdemeanor) under
federal law.99 In support of its position, the government relied
not only on this purportedly plain language, but also on a portion
of 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43), which provided that "[t]he term [i.e.,
aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this
paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law."
' 00
According to the government, this language demonstrated that
Congress intended "any felony" drug offense-including simple
possession-to qualify as "drug trafficking" under
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) so long as the state labeled the offense a
"felony" and it was concurrently "punishable" under the federal
drug laws, albeit as a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). 10 1
In sum, the government contended that, because the statutory
language was "plain" and "unambiguous," the Court should
eschew application of both the rule of lenity and its equivalent
doctrine in the civil immigration context. 10 2 Finally, the
government claimed that the petitioners' position would not in
fact promote uniformity in the application of the immigration
laws. "[T]he dispute here is not between uniformity and
disuniformity," the government claimed. Rather, it was "a
dispute about different baselines for uniformity."
10 3
98. See Br. of Respts., Lopez v. Gonzales, Nos. 05-547 & 05-7664, 2006 WL 2474082,
at *25 (Aug. 23, 2006) ("We agree with Lopez ... that the term 'felony' in Section
924(c)(2) takes its meaning from within the framework of Title 18, rather than from Title
21 .") [hereinafter Government Brief].
99. Seeid. at *13-*49.
100. See id. at *22-*23 (referring to penultimate sentence of 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)).
101. See id. at *22-*39.
102. See id. at *43-*45.
103. Id. at *45.
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B. The Petitioners' Position
The government was of course responding to an argument
made in the opening briefs of the petitioners in both Lopez and
Toledo-Flores: that the common meaning of drug trafficking
cannot be fairly interpreted to include simple possession.
They also contended that the language and structure of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)-which was incorporated into 8 U.S.C.
§ 110 1(a)(43)(B) as its definition of drug trafficking-indicated
that Congress intended "drug trafficking crime" as used here to
be limited to federal felony drug offenses.' 05
In particular, the petitioners pointed out, section
924(c)(1)(A) refers to drug trafficking crimes "for which [a
defendant] may be prosecuted in a court of the United States."
1u 6
In that regard, they observed that the government previously had
conceded that using a firearm during and in relation to a simple
possession offense was insufficient to support a conviction
under section 924(c) because actual drug trafficking activity was
required as an essential element of the offense contained in that
section. 10 7 They also noted that, prior to its amendment in 1988,
section 924(c) expressly defined "drug trafficking crime" as
"any felony violation of federal law involving the distribution,
manufacture, or importation of a controlled substance," and that
the legislative history of the 1988 amendment reveals that
Congress intended the amendment to be merely a "clarification
of the [existing] definition of drug trafficking crimes." 08 They
also pointed out that the grammatical structure of section
924(c)(2)-"any felony punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act"-was virtually identical to that of § 924(k)(2),
in which the phrase "punishable under the Controlled
104. Br. of Petr., Lopez v. Gonzales, 2006 WL 1696179 (June 19, 2006), at *18-'*19
[hereinafter Lopez Brief]; Br. of Petr., Toledo-Flores v. U.S., 2006 WL 1858831 (June 19,
2006), at * 15-* 16 [hereinafter Toledo-Flores Brief].
105. Lopez Brief, supra n. 104, at *21-*23; Toledo-Flores Brief, supra n. 104, at *20-
*24.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
107. Toledo-Flores Brief, supra n. 104, at *20-*21 (citing Price v. U.S., 537 U.S. 1152
(2003) (per curiam)).
108. Lopez Brief, supra n. 104, at *30; Toledo-Flores Brief, supra n. 104, at *30-*31. It
bears noting that the legislative history contains no explanation for Congress's deletion of
the established definition of "drug trafficking crime" from the clarifying legislation passed
in 1988.
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Substances Act" was intended to refer only to federal offenses,
and not to state-law offenses.' 
09
The petitioners next invoked the well-established canon of
statutory construction providing that, unless Congress plainly
indicates otherwise, federal statutes must not be construed to
"make the application of the federal act dependent on [the
vagaries of] state law," and pointed out that this was particularly
true in the context of immigration law, where the importance of
national uniformity is suggested by the Constitution itself.110
Therefore, they contended, "any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act" should be construed to mean only
conduct punishable as a federal felony. Congress, they pointed
out, had not plainly indicated that "any felony" included a state
felony concurrently punishable only as a federal
misdemeanor."' With respect to the Justice Department's
reliance on the penultimate sentence of section 1101(a)(43),
which states that section l101(a)(43)'s list of "aggravated
felonies" applies to offenses described there "whether in
violation of Federal or State law," the petitioners argued that this
clause did not alter the meaning of section 1101(a)(43)(B)'s
definition of drug trafficking (which incorporated the 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) definition). 1 2 Finally, the petitioners contended that, if
any doubt remained, the rule of lenity and its immigration-law
counterpart required the Court to interpret the statutory
provisions at issue in their favor." 3
109. Toledo-Flores Brief, supra n. 104, at *25-*26 (pointing out that section 924(k)
speaks of conduct "punishable under the Controlled Substances Act" or "that violates any
state law relating to any controlled substance"). Thus, the argument was that another
provision of the same statute showed that Congress knew how to indicate that state as well
as federal offenses were implicated, and that Congress had not done so in section
924(c)(2).
110. Toledo-Flores Brief, supra n. 104, at *29 (quoting Jerome v. U.S., 318 U.S. 101,
104 (1943)); see also Lopez Brief, supra n. 104, at *33-*35 (quoting U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8:
"The Congress shall have the Power to .. .establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization"),
*37-*38 (referring to the established presumption that Congress intends to adopt uniform
definitions of offenses, and citing Taylor v. U.S., 495 U.S. 575, 590-92 (1990)).
111. Toledo-Flores Brief, supra n. 104, at *15; see also Lopez Brief, supra n. 104, at
*25-*26.
112. Reply Br. of Petr., Lopez v. Gonzales, 2006 WL 2688754, at *12 (Sept. 18, 2006);
Reply Br. of Petr., Toledo-Flores v. U.S., 2006 WL 2710733, at *13-*14 (Sept. 18, 2006).
113. Lopez Brief, supra n. 104, at *37-*38; Toledo-Flores Brief, supra n. 104, at *38-
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C. The Supreme Court's Decision
In late 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision on the
merits in Lopez and dismissed the petition for writ of certiorari
in Toledo-Flores as improvidently granted,' 14 likely because
Toledo-Flores had been deported after certiorari was granted." 5
By a vote of eight to one, with Justice Souter writing the opinion
and only Justice Thomas dissenting, the Court agreed with
Lopez and rejected the Justice Department's arguments. At the
outset, the Court stated that the Justice Department's position
created "incoherence with any commonsense conception of
'illicit [drug] trafficking,' the term ultimately being defined."'"16
And it pointed out in addition that "[r]eading § 924(c) the
Government's way ... would often turn simple possession into
trafficking, just what the English language tells us not to
expect."' The Court acknowledged that "Congress can define
an aggravated felony of illicit trafficking in an unexpected way,"
but added that "Congress would need to tell us so, and there are
good reasons to think it was doing no such thing here.""
8
First, the Court noted that, if Congress had intended to treat
"any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act" as
including a state law felony concurrently punishable only as a
misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), Congress "would have
found a much less misleading way to make the point" than the
Justice Department's tortured statutory interpretation.11
9
Recognizing that other provisions in section 924 demonstrate
Congress's ability to incorporate state law offenses alongside
federal offenses when it intends to do so, the Court concluded
that the "any felony" phrase does not sweep in all state felony
offenses concurrently "punishable" under federal law.
120
114. See Lopez, 127 S. Ct. 625; Toledo-Flores, 127 S. Ct. 638.
115. Toledo-Flores's deportation raised a mootness issue that the Court appeared
unwilling to address. See Government Brief, supra n. 98, at *10-*13 (contending that
Toledo-Flores's appeal was moot because he had been deported following the grant of
certiorari).
116. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 629-30.
117. Id. at 630.
118. Id. (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at 630-31.
120. Id. at 63 1(comparing sections 924(g)(3) and 924(k)(2) to section 924(c)(2)).
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The Court next rejected the Justice Department's reliance
on the penultimate sentence of 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43), stating
that the government was "wrenching the expectations raised by
normal English usage" by interpreting it to mean that Congress
intended a state felony conviction for possession to qualify as a
drug "trafficking" crime.' That sentence, the Court explained,
simply covers state offenses that otherwise would qualify under
the definition of aggravated felonies listed in the first part of the
statute; it does not, however, broaden the specific definitions to
include state offenses (such as simple possession) that do not
otherwise qualify under section 1 101(a)(43). 122
The Court next stressed that the interpretation advanced in
the Justice Department's arguments contradicted its own history
of applying a different definition in section 924(c) prosecutions:
[T]he Government admits that, it has never begun a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) where the
underlying "drug trafficking crime" was a state felony but a
federal misdemeanor .... This is telling: the failure of even
a single eager Assistant United States Attorney to act on the
Government's interpretation of "felony punishable under
the [Controlled Substances Act]" in the very context in
which the phrase appears in the United States Code belies
the Government's claim that the interpretation is the more
natural one.123
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of uniformity, noting
that the Justice Department's position "would render the law of
alien removal . . . and the law of sentencing for illegal reentry
into the country . . . dependent on varying state criminal
classifications." 24 The Court agreed that Congress was free to
enact such a scheme if it wished, but that Congress appeared not
to have done so in section 1101(a)(43)(B), which specifically
incorporated federal statutory definition of "drug trafficking."' 1
As the Court put it, "We cannot imagine that Congress took the
trouble to incorporate its own statutory scheme of felonies and
121. Id.
122. Id. at 631-32.
123. Id. at 632 (footnotes omitted); see also Transcr. of Oral Argument, Lopez v.
Gonzales, 2006 WL 3069258, at *27-*28 (Oct. 3, 2006).
124. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 632.
125. Id. at 632-33.
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misdemeanors if it meant courts to ignore whenever a State
chose to punish given act more heavily."'
126
Although its dismissal of Toledo-Flores meant that the
Court never directly decided whether its interpretation of
section 1l101(a)(43)(B) in Lopez was equally applicable to
federal criminal immigration cases, it seems implicitly to have
recognized that this holding applies in both civil and criminal
contexts. And the courts of appeals have so far read and applied
Lopez this way.'
27
After fifteen years of litigation that resulted in a
multidimensional split involving federal appeals courts and
immigration judges, the Supreme Court resolved the issues
raised by Lopez in aliens' favor. During that period, however,
many thousands of aliens were erroneously treated as aggravated
felons in the civil and criminal contexts, which resulted in
countless deportations and enhanced prison sentences that
otherwise would never have occurred.
V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM LOPEZ
In our common law system, reasonable jurists frequently
will differ about a complicated legal issue involving federal law,
and litigation over such an issue will take some time to
culminate in a decision by the Supreme Court.' 28 Nevertheless,
126. Id. And in a footnote, the Court stated that the Justice Department had "wisely
concede[d]" that the definition of "felony" in 21 U.S.C. § 802(13), was inapplicable and
that the traditional Title 18 dichotomy between felonies and misdemeanors applied instead.
Id. at 631 n. 7.
127. See U.S. v. Estrada-Mendoza, 475 F.3d 258, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding,
after analyzing Lopez, that it "ineluctably applies with equal force to immigration and
criminal cases"); accord U.S. v. Martinez-Macias, 472 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2007); U.S. v.
Serratos-Marentes, 2007 WL 582505 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2007) (unpublished) (accepting
government's concession that Lopez applied to criminal immigration appeal); see also
Leocal v. Ashcrofi, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n. 8 (2004) (holding that immigration statutes that apply
in both civil and criminal contexts must be interpreted in the same manner in both).
128. See e.g. McCray v. NY, 461 U.S. 961, 961-32 (1983) (Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari, joined by Blackmun & Powell, JJ.) ("My vote to deny certiorari in
these cases does not reflect disagreement with Justice Marshall's appraisal of the
importance of the underlying issue-whether the Constitution prohibits the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular group from the jury, based on
the prosecutor's assumption that they will be biased in favor of other members of the same
group. I believe that further consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications
of the problem by other courts will enable us to deal with the issue more wisely at a later
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what occurred in the federal appellate system from the early
1990s through the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez in late
2006 is remarkable in several respects. The blame fairly can be
laid at the feet of several institutional players.
A. A Lesson for the Federal Courts ofAppeals
First and foremost, judges on numerous federal appeals
courts gave short shrift to arguments that should have received
in-depth, meaningful consideration. Particularly troublesome is
the cursory approach to the issue taken in the 1990s by the First,
Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 129 It is not as if those
courts were following a seminal, well-reasoned opinion of one
circuit without any contrary position having been articulated, as
is frequently the case when a solid wall of circuit authority
develops. Instead, the guiding principle supposedly appearing in
the First Circuit's Amaral decision was dicta in a footnote that
offered virtually no legal analysis and was more in the form of
an ipse dixit. 130 Moreover, in 1995, the unanimous en banc
Board of Immigration Appeals offered a lengthy, well-reasoned,
and well-researched opinion explaining its disagreement with
the First Circuit's position.' 31 The Second Circuit was alone in
recognizing-at least to some degree-the force of the BIA's
position,13z while the other circuits either summarily dismissed
the BIA's reasoning 33 or simply ignored it' 34 after claiming that
the relevant statutory language plainly or unambiguously
favored the government's position.
date. There is presently no conflict of decision within the federal system."); see generally
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 389
(Summer 2004).
129. See text accompanying nn. 23-29 and 47-53, supra.
130. Amaral, 977 F.2d at 35-36 & n. 3.
131. In Re L-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 89.
132. Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317-18; but cf U.S. v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142 (refusing to
adopt BIA's approach in criminal immigration cases).
133. In a single short paragraph, the First Circuit, in a decision after In Re L-G-,
commented that "the text of the relevant [statutory] provisions ... forecloses" the BIA's
position. U.S. v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d at 364.
134. U.S. v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271; U.S. v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691; U.S. v.
Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308; U.S. v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998.
135. See e.g. Simon, 168 F.3d at 1272 (referring to "plain language").
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In the Seventh Circuit's 2006 decision disagreeing with the
earlier phalanx of circuit courts, Judge Posner dismissed the
Justice Department's legal arguments in part by noting that
"[t]he only consistency that we can see in the government's
treatment of the meaning of 'aggravated felony' is that the alien
always loses."'1 36 And to the extent that many other circuits
uncritically adopted the Justice Department's untenable position,
Judge Posner's censure seems applicable to them as well. In
mitigation of the courts' failings here, however, it must be
acknowledged that the modem federal appellate system, with its
burgeoning caseloads (composed in some significant part of
immigration-related appeals 37), is hard-pressed to generate the
generally higher quality product of an earlier era.138
B. A Lesson for the Justice Department
The Justice Department deserves blame, not only for the
reason articulated by Judge Posner, but also because it failed to
ensure that the many thousands of aliens convicted for simple
possession received equal treatment-in civil and criminal
immigration cases-across the country. As early as the mid-
1990s, when the BIA expressly disagreed with the First Circuit
136. Gonzalez-Gomez, 441 F.3d at 535.
137. See e.g. John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 13 (2006-07);
Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and Change: Patterns of
Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990,45 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (Nov. 1992).
138. See Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 685, 687-88 (2000). As Professors
Cooper and Berman have explained,
[t]he practices of the lower federal courts have also changed, particularly
operations in the courts of appeals. With a much smaller caseload, decision-
making in the federal circuit courts could reasonably aspire to what has been
described as "the Learned Hand model"-a model in which cases are decided by
a panel of collegial judges, following full briefing and oral argument, through a
published opinion crafted by one of the judges after receiving considerable input
from other circuit judges. But while many still long for this idealized model of
appellate decision-making, there is no doubt that the modem courts of appeals
cannot and do not operate in this manner (to the extent that they ever did so).
Id. at 688 (footnote omitted); see also Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the Trenches: A
Report on the Breakout Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, 8 J.
App. Prac. & Process 141, 178-202 (2006) (summarizing and analyzing discussions among
judges, lawyers, and academics about issues relating to "Volume, Process, and the
Responsibility for Decision").
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when deciding In Re L-G-, the Justice Department was faced
with disparate treatment of identically situated aliens that
depended solely upon the federal circuits in which their
immigration cases were being litigated. This disparate treatment
only increased over the years, initially when the Second Circuit
sided with the BIA and diverged from the First Circuit, and later
when the Third Circuit split with the numerous other circuits
that had followed the First. Inexplicably, the Justice Department
never sought review of either the BIA's decision in In Re L-
- or the BIA's 1999 reaffirmation of that case in In Re K-
V-D--, despite the fact that cases involving scores of
identically situated aliens that were then being treated differently
only because they had been filed in different circuits. Nor did
the Justice Department seek Supreme Court review of the Third
Circuit's 2002 decision in Holmes.' 39 It was not until the Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuit joined the Second and Third Circuits
in 2005 and 2006 that the Justice Department finally agreed that
the Supreme Court should intervene and resolve the circuit split.
The Justice Department made no attempt to seek Supreme
Court review of this issue despite the fact that it serves a unique
role in our system through the Office of the Solicitor General,
which is recognized as a virtual adjunct to the Supreme Court
when performing its role in identifying important federal law
issues of national importance and presenting them for review.
140
In the decade before 2006, the Department failed to discharge
this duty in the litigation that culminated in Lopez.
139. Not only did the Justice Department fail to seek review when it lost in the lower
courts, it opposed Supreme Court review of the issue in a Fifth Circuit in 2002. See Br. of
U.S. in Opposition, Amaya-Matamoros v. U.S., No. 01-8643 (May 24, 2002) 10-13 (copy
on file with author).
140. See e.g. Robert L. Stem et al., Supreme Court Practice, 221 & n. 6 (8th ed. 2002)
(generally discussing the great influence that the Solicitor General has in instigating
Supreme Court review, and citing numerous illustrative examples); see also U.S. Dept. of
J., About the Office of the Solicitor General, http://usdoj.gov/osg/aboutus.htm (stating that
"[t]he task of the Office of the Solicitor General is to supervise and conduct government
litigation in the United States Supreme Court. Virtually all such litigation is channeled
through the Office of the Solicitor General and is actively conducted by the Office. The
United States is involved in approximately two-thirds of all the cases the U.S. Supreme
Court decides on the merits each year. The Solicitor General determines the cases in which
Supreme Court review will be sought by the government and the positions the government
will take before the Court .... Another responsibility of the Office is to review all cases
decided adversely to the government in the lower courts to determine whether they should
be appealed and, if so, what position should be taken.").
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C. A Lesson for the Supreme Court
Finally, the Supreme Court itself should accept some share
of responsibility for the unnecessarily protracted litigation that
ultimately led to resolution of the issue addressed in Lopez. The
Court had several earlier opportunities to resolve the issue in
both the civil and criminal contexts, but failed repeatedly to do
so even after a circuit split had developed.14 1 Countless aliens
were as a result erroneously treated as aggravated felons.
D. A Lesson for Practitioners
Despite these failures by institutional failures, there is a
silver lining in this cloud. From the mid-1990s until Lopez was
decided in late 2006, counsel for aliens in both civil and criminal
cases continued to preserve and litigate the aggravated-felony
issue, even in the face of threatened sanctions for raising what
one circuit court deemed a "frivolous" claim. 42  That
perseverance eventually persuaded Judge Canby to dissent in
Ibarra-Galindo, and it also persuaded the Third Circuit to
diverge in Holmes from what was then the clear majority
position; at that point, the tide seemed to turn and a wider circuit
split developed. The Supreme Court eventually issued a near-
unanimous opinion that rejected the Justice Department's
arguments, vindicating the work of the lawyers who had argued
for years that the Justice Department had taken the wrong
position on this extremely important issue. That vindication,
however, came too late for the thousands of aliens wrongly
treated as aggravated felons during the fifteen years before
Lopez was decided. One can only hope that in future cases the
same institutional players will not repeat the errors so vividly
apparent in the history of the litigation culminating in Lopez.
141. See e.g. Pornes-Garcia v. U.S., 528 U.S. 880 (1999) (denying certiorari);
Hernandez-Avalos v. U.S., 534 U.S. 935 (2001) (same).
142. See supra n. 6; see also Brent E. Newton, An Argument for Reviving the Actual
Futility Exception to the Supreme Court's Procedural Default Doctrine, 4 J. App. Prac. &
Process 521, 559-60 (2002) (discussing the need for counsel to prepare for changes in
appellate precedent by preserving legal issues that, although apparently foreclosed, may
have merit for future appeals).
